# 1

# A Distinct Methodological Framework

## Introduction

This chapter will present the methodological foundation of this book. The aim of this book is to demonstrate how engaging in a dialogical relationship with a contrary ideology can be beneficial to theology. It will argue that such a dialogue has become a theological necessity in twenty-first-century academia, by exploring the emphasis on pluralism in contemporary theology. The Oxford biologist and prominent religious antagonist Richard Dawkins will thus be taken as the embodiment of a contrary ideology. Dawkins' worldview exemplifies a particular school of thought on evolutionary science, which he presents as materialist and atheistic. Dawkins also represents the view that theology is an intellectually weak discipline, failing to engage in an honest philosophical analysis of its own themes. By entering into a dialogue with Dawkins, we can contribute to combating this public perception which undermines theological endeavours. We can show how theology is prepared to directly take on its most vehement critics, thereby demonstrating how theology can be a self-critiquing discipline.

The questioning of the legitimacy of theology by figures such as Dawkins cannot be ignored. Therefore, this work will show how a dialogical approach to theology and those of Dawkins' 'anti-theology' persuasion may be played out. In doing so, it will advocate a framework for future theological projects to consider a wider range of intellectual sources, as opposed to focusing on perspectives more obviously amenable to a theological position. It will show that acknowledging the merits and weaknesses of an alternative worldview, even one that is overtly atheistic and anti-religious, may offer a new dimension to theological debate. Therefore, the interest of this work lies not with Dawkins *per se*, but with how theology is approached in a pluralistic world. To clarify, by 'pluralism', I mean simply a plurality or variety of worldviews in constant dialogue with one another sharing but not necessarily adopting each other's beliefs (though this may occur). We will consider what influence a dialogue

with a hostile worldview may have for a religious philosophy, and we have taken Dawkins as an example to illustrate such a dialogue. In order to embark on this theological venture, a firm foundation of the motives, method, and limitations of the study must be presented. This will be the task of this chapter.

## Motives and Presuppositions

The setting of the modern intellectual marketplace in which this book is situated brings with it particular considerations pertaining to how one does theology. The technological advances in information sharing have led to the realization that there is an ever-pressing need for an open, dialogical theology. This section will focus on the recognition of this point in contemporary theology. It will place emphasis on the need for theological dialogue with diverse ideologies, and then show how Dawkins will be taken as a representative of such an ideology. The focus will then shift to the emphasis placed on interdisciplinary dialogue in modern theology, and subsequently elaborate on why Dawkins is a suitable candidate for an interdisciplinary dialogue.

### *Dawkins as an Ideological 'Other'*

The post-globalization academic realm can be characterized by the significant dissolution of barriers between academic disciplines and spiritual traditions. The technological advancements over the last several decades have allowed an unprecedented flow of information among the world's diverse population. The Latin American theologian Leonardo Boff considers the implications of this realization, as he suggests that a diverse intercultural dialogue can now take place:

> The process of globalization signifies more than just an economic-financial-media phenomenon . . . it is the time when all the tribes can meet each other and exchange knowledge, values, and ethical and spiritual traditions and usher in a dialogue among the most diverse cultures and religions.[1]

In the passage quoted here, Boff is referring to the emergence of a post-globalization scenario in which theology and religion are exposed to other disciplines and value systems.

Similarly, in 1983, a symposium was held to address the development of a new theological paradigm that sought to meet the requirements of this scenario.[2] At this symposium, the prominent Swiss theologian Hans Küng[3]

stressed that theology should strive to develop a pluralistic model, transforming from particularist to universal thinking: "Our goal is a plural theology, open to learn and ready to discuss; one which—rooted in the Christian tradition—can provide an answer to the challenges of our time".[4] This approach potentially represents a decisive shift away from the outlook of classical theological scholars such as St. Augustine, who contested that the pursuit of knowledge was an irresistible evil.[5] A pluralistic, dialogical model of theology had also previously been posited by Karl Rahner, who insightfully proposed that ". . . given that every 'world-view' wants to pass off its very nature from an actually particular view to being also an actually universal one, there remains no other means open to it apart from the mission by talk and the attempt to convince, in short, . . . dialogue".[6] Rahner, furthermore, contested that the appropriate way to engage with such pluralism ". . . can only consist in an attitude which carefully and critically examines, holds itself open to further knowledge and modifications of previous knowledge, is modest, tries to discover the transcendental experience in all the 'systems' put forward, and yet has the courage to make decisions . . . ".[7] Rahner can be interpreted here as espousing a model of dialogue that is modestly open to the "careful and critical" examination of other viewpoints. Comparably, the influential Canadian theologian Bernard Lonergan also highlights the need for a pluralistic approach, given the diversity of humanity.[8]

As we have seen above, through the writings of several important theological figures, there is an incontrovertible significance attributed to pluralistic dialogue in modern theology. However, as the Irish theologian Dermot Lane explains, the issue of the relationship between Christianity and other cultures has always been prominent:

> The question about the relationship between faith and culture is in one sense as old as Christianity itself. It arose in a particularly acute form in the first century when the early Church was faced with difficult questions about the admission of Gentiles into the Christian community without circumcision. It continued to exercise the early Church towards the end of the first century and well into the second century as the Church made her pilgrim way from a largely Jewish matrix into a Hellenistic culture.[9]

Notwithstanding the history of Christianity's relationship with the non-Christian world, Lane also suggests that the character of the modern world brings anew the necessity of a multicultural dialogue:

> Another reason why inculturation is a relatively recent issue is that cultural differences in this century have created a new challenge to the meaning of the gospel in the twentieth century. These cultural changes have included a movement from the classical culture to a historical one, the shift from a pre-scientific culture to a scientific one and the emergence of a second enlightenment which now focuses not simply on the age of reason but on the question of practical reason. . . . To ignore these cultural changes is to end up giving answers to questions people no longer ask.[10]

Lane's reference to a scientific culture is particularly pertinent to our current task of engaging with Dawkins, because as we shall see in the next section, he is also taken as a representative of the discipline of evolutionary science. At this point, however, we are seeking to establish that modern cultural shifts create a more pressing need for a pluralistic theology.

Further support for this pluralistic approach can be found from the theologian David Ford. Writing in 1996, Ford envisioned that the future of theology would be pluralistic and hospitable to others: "A theology under the sign of hospitality is formed through its generous welcome to others—theologies, traditions, disciplines, and spheres of life . . . ".[11] Harvard theological scholar Francis Schüssler Fiorenza also insists that theology must "take pluralism seriously",[12] while Oxford theologian Alister McGrath signifies radical global migration as a catalyst for Christian theologians to provide a "theological account of the relation of Christianity to other religions".[13] Similarly, Irish biblical scholar Máire Byrne highlights how the international experience of religious and secular pluralism is having a marked influence on how theology and religious studies are approached.[14]

It can be discerned then, that there is a powerful emphasis on a dialogical and pluralistic theology, which is particularly relevant in light of the transformational advances in information sharing in modern society. The Irish theologian Enda McDonagh goes as far as to say that "at its best, theology has been a truly dialogical discipline".[15] Theology needs to be pluralist, and again, by pluralist I mean that theology must be open to others' beliefs, not necessarily adopting them, but at least willing to investigate whether they can provide insight. Consistent with the theological motif of pluralism, this work will open a dialogical relationship with Dawkins. Dawkins is taken in this project to represent an example of an ideological system that, according to Rahner, theology must examine and open itself to. The ideology Dawkins is taken to represent can be discerned as atheistic naturalism or materialism[16]—he

has been identified as such by authoritative scholars such as Keith Ward,[17] John Haught,[18] Ian S. Markham,[19] and others. Consequently, we are showing how the dialogical model advocated by Rahner and others mentioned above may operate in the concrete, as opposed to in the abstract. We are not just *discussing* a methodology that engages with ideologies inimical to theology, but *employing* such a methodology.

In a dialogue with naturalism a caveat immediately presents itself, as 'naturalism' is not a definitive term and we should be aware of the ambiguity in its use. Cambridge philosopher Simon Blackburn, in *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*, defines 'naturalism' as "the view that ultimately nothing resists explanation by the methods characteristic of the natural sciences".[20] However, scientists Karl Giberson and Mariano Artigas make the important clarification between 'methodological naturalism' and 'ontological naturalism'.[21] They perceptively note that methodological naturalism is the commitment to seek natural explanations. Ontological naturalism, though, denies the existence of anything that cannot be studied by scientific method. Ontological naturalism is then ultimately a *philosophical* position—predominantly an atheistic position, if one accepts that God cannot be studied through science.[22] The eminent philosopher of religion David Ray Griffin also argues that what is usually understood by the term 'naturalism' is the claim that "nature is all there is".[23] Comparable to Giberson and Artigas, Griffin distinguishes between naturalism in this sense (ontological) and naturalism "properly supposed", which involves the "rejection of supernatural interruptions of the normal causal processes of the world".[24] As it pertains to our current study, the salient point from these clarifications is that naturalism is not synonymous with atheism—although for Dawkins, as we shall see in Chapter Three, the naturalistic explanation of life excludes God. We will encounter critiques of Dawkins in this regard in more detail in Chapter Five. At this point, however, we can establish that Dawkins is to be taken as the embodiment of a naturalistic standpoint (in both senses of naturalism), an ideology with which theology can engage dialogically. The need for such dialogue with a naturalistic worldview can be further substantiated by acknowledging along with Keith Ward that naturalism/materialism has become a fashionable position in academia.[25]

In addition, atheism itself could be considered a model of 'faith'. As the highly influential French philosopher Paul Ricoeur posited, atheism can be considered ". . . a type of faith that might be called . . . a postreligious faith or a faith for a postreligious age".[26] The Irish theologian James Mackey similarly suggests that atheism, if it has been arrived at through philosophical reasoning, can be considered a theology.[27] If we accept Ricoeur and Mackey's

views in this regard, then Dawkins' atheistic ideology could be considered a 'faith' or perhaps even a theology. If this were the case, than it would add further weight to our motives for engaging with him, as the eminent American theologian David Tracy and others insist that interfaith dialogue is no longer a luxury but a theological necessity.[28] However, even if the premise that atheism can be equated to a faith/theology is not accepted, we can still hold Dawkins as an ideological 'other'; a representative of atheistic materialism, as outlined above. We can also find precedent support from the Catholic Church for the need for a dialogue with atheism as a part of the ideologically pluralistic world. The theologian Michael Paul Gallagher gives a brief synopsis of how in 1965, Pope Paul VI established a Secretariat for Non-Believers with the intention of forming a dialogue with secularization.[29] In 1988 the Secretariat then became the Pontifical Council for Dialogue with Non-Believers. However, most pertinently, in 1993 Pope John Paul II amalgamated this council with the Pontifical Council for Culture, which sought a dialogue between the Church and other faiths and cultures.[30] In this sense, it could be argued that Pope John Paul II identified a dialogue with atheism or nonbelief as an element of a dialogue with other faiths/ideologies. Therefore, in opening a dialogical relationship with Dawkins as a part of the current pluralistic setting of modern academia, this work may be considered to echo the goals of the Pontifical Council for Culture.

### *Dawkins as an Interdisciplinary 'Other'*

For the purposes of this project, Dawkins is also taken as a representative of the discipline of evolutionary science. David Tracy has asserted his belief in the importance of theology's engagement with other disciplines, particularly within contemporary academia. He proposes that theology should not be a stand-alone field in the university setting in which it finds itself: "Indeed the university setting of theology, by forcing theology to engage itself with other disciplines, also forces to the centre of theological attention the public character of any theological statement".[31] Pope John Paul II also expressed corresponding views. In addressing an international congress for university cooperation,[32] he proclaimed that humans are by nature interdisciplinary, and therefore, due to the rapid fragmentation of knowledge, there is an urgent need to cultivate a counterbalancing integrative approach to study and research.[33] The distinguished theologian John B. Cobb and others have also professed that through correlations with secular disciplines, theology itself finds deeper justification as an academic field.[34] This need for an interdisciplinary approach to theology is also a motive for engaging with Dawkins as a representative of

another discipline, namely science, or more specifically, evolutionary biology. The importance of mutual discussion between science and theology, despite its tumultuous history,[35] has been stressed by seminal scholars such as continental theologians Jürgen Moltmann[36] and Hans Küng,[37] among others.[38]

Furthermore, the eminent British theologian Tina Beattie has stressed the dissolution of boundaries between science, theology, and philosophy in modern times.[39] In this context, Dawkins also becomes a conspicuous choice for dialogue with theology as he, intentionally or not, attempts to intellectually pass freely between these disciplines. For example, the prominent theologian Alister McGrath[40] explains that Dawkins champions his own scientific field of evolutionary biology as an atheistic worldview.[41] McGrath illustrates that Dawkins has presented Darwinism (which, as we shall see, is itself an indefinite term and thus requires a caveat of the language often employed in discourse on the issue), as transcending the confines of science, morphing into a philosophical outlook.[42] To strengthen this interpretation, Dawkins has been identified as an honorary philosopher of sorts by his intellectual ally, authoritative philosopher Daniel C. Dennett (Dennett's own philosophical views on evolution as they pertain to our project will be considered in more detail in Chapter Three): "Dawkins' contribution on this conceptual front is philosophy at its best, informed by a wealth of empirical work and alert to the way subtle differences in expression can either trap a thinker in an artificial cul-de-sac or open up new vistas of implications heretofore only dimly imagined".[43]

Whether or not using Darwinism as a worldview is a positive step is the subject of disagreement among scientists and philosophers.[44] In the current context, however, we are establishing that Dawkins is amenable to interdisciplinary dialogue because of the fact that his work is not strictly confined to biology. Dawkins' forays into the topics of religion and theology are also of particular significance in the context of a theological project. His hostility toward theology makes him a credible, albeit unlikely, figure for theological consideration.[45] Though he will be criticized for his misunderstandings and lack of theological substance later in this chapter, the public character of his hostility toward religious ideas has accentuated public interest in theological questions; as Tina Beattie suggests, Dawkins has reawakened public interest in God "more effectively than any preacher could have done".[46] Paradoxically, Dawkins' hostility toward theology can be seen to have enlivened theological debate in the public sphere. Dawkins' focus on religion therefore offers a common ground to engage with—even if from an apologetic standpoint. Moreover, Dawkins presents his scientific/pseudo-

philosophical worldview to the nonscientist.[47] This makes the scientific elements of his worldview accessible to the theologian, and thus allows for a less restricted dialogue. This also aids the overall aim of this book, which is to exhibit how theology can broaden its horizons to include sources from other areas in the intellectual marketplace.

## Method

In the previous section, we have outlined the motives for concentrating on Dawkins as a dialogue partner for theology—in a sense, the 'why' of the book. This current section will now present the 'how'. We will look at how this book serves a niche of theological dialogue that rests within a wider context of dialogues. As we seek to present a dialogue with external sources, we must also be aware that theology has a broad scheme of internal dialogues that contextualise an engagement with Dawkins. This section will introduce the conceptual approach to science and religion/theology that will be adopted for this work, and then indicate the aspects of Dawkins' approach to theology/religion that we will not specifically engage with given that a) they have already been dealt with by several scholars, and b) they do not pertain to the task of this project. It should be disclaimed, however, that although we will not specifically engage with certain aspects of Dawkins' views on religion given that they have already received significant attention, there may be overlapping themes. We will then outline our approach to the philosophy of science and truth as it pertains to a dialogue with Dawkins.

### *A Dialogical Niche*

The proposed dialogical framework, exemplified in the context of this book as a theological dialogue with Dawkins, must be understood as one string in the much wider bow of theology; we are focusing on one part of the mosaic of theology. The style of dialogue proposed, which seeks to incorporate antithetical perspectives, is not a methodology that theology should solely focus on. However, it is argued that it will significantly contribute to the wider tapestry of theological projects. While the dialogue we seek could be described as an 'external dialogue', given that we seek to engage with a nontheologian (perhaps even an anti-theologian), there are also important 'internal dialogues'. Aside from a dialogue with its 'others', theology also has its own rich scholarly history.[48] Theology must therefore continually explore its own past, from classical theological scholars such as Tertullian, Pelagius, Augustine, and Aquinas, to more modern scholars such as Hans Urs von Balthasar, Karl Barth,

and Edward Schillebeeckx. We can see evidence of how this exploration of classical theologians continues to lead to insightful discourse in Fergus Kerr and Brian Davies' recent studies of Aquinas,[49] or Carly Daniel-Hughes' recent analysis of Tertullian.[50] Correspondingly, theology continues to gain from ongoing studies of twentieth-century theologians, such as Karen Kilby's fascinating work on Rahner,[51] or Aberdeen theologian John Webster's study of Karl Barth.[52]

Moreover, there is also the need for commitment to the renewal of past theological figures as dialogue partners for present theology. For example, the Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams published a fascinating study of Teresa of Avila, which demonstrates how her writings can be a potent source for consideration when faced with our contemporary social issues. Harvard divinity professor Beverly Mayne-Kienzle also contributes to the task of renewing historical theological figures with her examination of Hildegard of Bingen,[53] as does Irish theologian John Scally in his discussion of the legacy of Catherine of Siena.[54] Another interesting work in this area is James Bremner's *The Power of Then*, which explores a variety of scholars from the past and applies their teachings to modern problems, such as Hildegard of Bingen's emphasis on an environmental ethic.[55] For the purposes of this book, we are focusing on a very particular element of theological dialogue, namely, engaging with external sources, even those who appear to be inimical to theology. However, this task should be placed in the context of wider theological endeavours. It is not the sole future of theology, and indeed, cannot be truly appreciated unless placed in this context. For example, we will see in Chapter Five how a dialogue with Dawkins can be placed against the backdrop of theology's rich history of contemplating issues such as the problem of evil in the works of Augustine and Irenaeus. This theological approach based on dialogue is not actually new. It has a rich and honorable tradition.

The mode of dialogue proposed in this book is therefore one element of theology's multifaceted pilgrimage toward the understanding of God; it is one contributory facet of the Anselmian endeavour, "faith seeking understanding". As Dublin-based theologian Maureen Junker-Kenny suggests, "faith seeking understanding" no longer has a "singular defined counterpart to connect with".[56] In fact, even the classical Anselmian approach of *fides quaerens intellectum* cannot be viewed as the sole option for theology. For example, Saint Ephrem of Syria's theology has been described as *fides adorans mysterium* (faith adoring the mystery), providing an alternative to Anselm. However, the Eurocentric account of church history tends to favor Anselm while Ephrem's theology has, to an extent, been lost in the West.[57] As has been suggested, it

is the multicultural context of information sharing in the modern world that exposes theology to new avenues that must be explored. Bishop of Durham David Jenkins suggests that with the challenges and opportunities of this modern setting, the image of the pilgrimage surfaces; we are on a pilgrimage of exploration, seeking to deepen our understanding.[58] If we take this image of a theological pilgrimage seriously, then we must acknowledge that on this pilgrimage we leave our comfort zone and expose ourselves to our opposition. This element of the pilgrimage is manifest in this book by an exploration of one of theology's most adverse critics. However, it is through this pilgrimage, becoming exposed to our opposition, that theology can find new ways forward and gain new insights. As John Scally explains, "Yet it is only as the pilgrim faces these temptations and leaves behind the security of the known that the way itself becomes clear".[59] Although dialogues with perspectives that appear antagonistic toward theology are in their early stages, we can see evidence of rich theological dividend in works such as Neil Messer's *Selfish Genes and Christian Ethics*, as he explores the possibility of dialogue with an evolutionary perspective on our moral experience.[60] Consequently, engaging with external, even hostile worldviews can be discerned as the dialogical niche of this book, which fits into the wider web of theological dialogue by cautiously advancing into these rarely explored areas—though this is not to understate previous studies of atheism from theologians such as Henri de Lubac,[61] Alister McGrath,[62] and Michael Paul Gallagher.[63]

### *Approaches to Religion and Science*

Religion and science have had a complex and fractious historical relationship. As such, there has been a variety of relational models adopted toward the interplay between the two disciplines. This section will outline three major positions: conflict, independence, and dialogue. One popular relational model between science and religion is that of conflict, even described by some as "warfare".[64] Scientists such as Dawkins himself hold this interpretation.[65] Correspondingly, certain religious scientists have viewed evolution as hostile toward their own belief systems, and thus emphatically rejected them, as geologist Kurt Wise (who studied under the late Stephen Jay Gould, to be introduced below) states: "[I]f all the evidence in the universe turns against creationism [a literal belief in the Genesis cosmogony], I would be the first to admit it, but I would still be a creationist because that is what the word of God seems to indicate".[66] However, it is also clear that highly respected scholars from both scientific and theological disciplines disregard the conflict model in favor of a mutually communicative approach; besides the theologians already mentioned

(Moltmann and Küng), scientists such as physicist Paul Davies,[67] geneticist Francis Collins,[68] and biologist Kenneth Miller[69] are prominent examples.

An alternative to the 'conflict' model was proposed by the renowned Harvard paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould. In Gould's model, science and religion are two distinct 'nonoverlapping magisteria' or 'NOMA'. Gould (whom we will include as a prominent adversary of Dawkins on issues in evolutionary science) developed the approach upon reflection subsequent to Pope John Paul's 1996 address to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences.[70] Gould argues that science and religion are concerned with distinctly separate topics, and thus cannot be in conflict:

> [E]ach subject has a legitimate magisterium, or domain of teaching authority—and these magisteria do not overlap (the principle that I would like to designate as NOMA, or "nonoverlapping magisteria"). The net of science covers the empirical universe: what it is made of (fact) and why does it work this way (theory). The net of religion extends over questions of moral meaning and value.[71]

For Gould, science does not impose itself on the religious domain, or vice versa, as both have decidedly separate arenas of inquiry. Elaborating upon the concept, Gould prudently states two distinguishing features of his NOMA approach. The first, he explains, is that both science and religion have equal status as magisteria. He defends the legitimacy and importance of religion in moral discourse, which he suggests is nonabsolute, and therefore, beyond the scope of science.[72] He highlights morality as a religious subject of equitable importance to scientific interests. In developing the concept of NOMA, Gould does concede that such questions of morality need not appeal directly to religion in its formal incarnations: "I will . . . construe as fundamentally religious . . . all moral discourse on principles that might activate the ideal of universal fellowship among people".[73] The second distinguishing feature pertains to the central premise of NOMA itself: that both magisteria are independent. "I hold that this non-overlapping runs to completion only in the important logical sense that standards for legitimate questions, and criteria for resolution, force the magisteria apart on the model of immiscibility".[74] Gould is not the sole protagonist of this view. The eminent biologist Francisco J. Ayala, a significant authority on science and religion, adopts a similar perspective: "[P]roperly understood, they [science and religion] *cannot* be in contradiction because science and religion concern different matters".[75] He echoes Gould by pointing out distinct matters dealt with independently by science and religion:

> Science concerns the processes that account for the natural world: how the planets move, the composition of matter and space, the origin and function of organisms. Religion concerns the meaning and purpose of the world and of human life, the proper relation of people to their Creator and to each other, the moral values that inspire and govern people's life.[76]

Gould further defends the outlook by insisting that its reasoning does not lie with diplomacy. He portrays NOMA as an authentic intellectual option with solid premises—those outlined above:

> NOMA is no whimpish, wallpapering, superficial device, acting as a mere diplomatic fiction and smoke screen to make life more convenient by compromise in a world of diverse and contradictory passions. NOMA is a proper and principled solution—based on sound philosophy—to an issue of great historical and emotional weight.[77]

NOMA is marketed as a 'taskmaster' that seeks to establish the boundaries between science and religion. NOMA then, at least in part, has an active role in determining which niches of the intellectual marketplace science and religion individually encompass.[78] However, despite Gould's promotion of this relational model of science and religion, he admits that categorizing these boundaries may be an onerous task. "Many of our deepest questions call upon aspects of both for different parts of a full answer—and the sorting of legitimate domains can become quite complex and difficult".[79] It is this aspect of the relational model of NOMA that will persuade us toward an alternative approach to the science-religion dialogue. Moreover, the explicit division of science and religion in the NOMA approach may be interpreted as conflicting with the emphasis on interdisciplinary dialogue in contemporary theology, which requires less compartmentalizing and a more integrated dialogue.

Gould himself admits that confining scientific and religious investigations to separate areas of inquiry can become highly intricate. It is predominantly for this reason that the model is rejected in the context of this project in favor of a more integrative approach. There are inherent problems with the NOMA model, which can be exemplified by reference to Gould's own thought on humanity's perceived place in the animal kingdom. He suggests that the Catholic concept of the human soul stems from the classical view of human superiority.[80] This theme is prevalent in classical theology and philosophy, as in Gen. 1:26: "Then God said, 'Let Us make man in Our image, according to

Our likeness; let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, over all the earth and over every creeping thing that creeps on earth'". The image of God (*imago Dei*) has been understood by classical theologians such as Augustine to be humanity's faculty for reason, which distinguishes humanity from the animal kingdom: "We ought therefore to cultivate in ourselves the faculty through which we are superior to the beasts . . . ".[81] A hierarchical vision of living creatures is also evident in classical thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle, who proposed images of a 'Great Chain of Being' in which humanity was above all living things on earth in a hierarchical model.[82]

However, this image, Gould acknowledges, is in contradiction with the view of evolutionary science, which we will encounter in more detail in Chapter Two. Evolution sees every living thing as descended from the same source (save to the extent of synthetically created life, which will be noted in Chapter Two), and thus none can be held to be superior:

> I may for example, privately suspect that papal insistence on divine infusion of the soul represents a sop to our fears, a device for maintaining belief in human superiority within an evolutionary world offering no privileged position to any creature.[83]

Here, Gould hints at an issue within the bounds of religious thought (the human soul/human superiority) for which evolutionary science has profound implications. He deflects the issue by placing the soul outside of the magisteria of science, despite the fact that he had acknowledged an overlap of interests between religion and science on the subject.[84] Ayala, who also seeks conceptual divisions between science and theology, goes slightly further than Gould, to explain that evolutionary science has dispelled the concept of a nonmaterial force in life; that the phenomena of life are not the result of "orthogenetic activity of any immanent nonmaterial force, be it called 'élan vital,' 'radial energy' or 'vital force'". (Such nonmaterial forces could be interpreted as a 'soul', which Gould maintained was beyond the realm of science.)[85] Based on their scientific interpretations, Gould and Ayala's thoughts on the soul or nonmaterial forces demonstrate inconsistency in attempting to maintain divisions between science and religion. Gould and Ayala propose that evolution has precluded the concepts of human superiority and the soul respectively, despite claiming that science and religion do not overlap.

Furthermore, Gould has been strident in his portrayal of randomness in the evolutionary process. He proffered the analogy in his acclaimed work *A Wonderful Life*, that if we rewound the history of evolution and let it play

again, there is such a massive degree of randomness that the results would be very different.[86] In this view, biological evolution is not teleological; it does not have directionality. This premise is also a key theme in the evolutionary view of Dawkins, as we shall see. Although evolution has resulted in self-reflecting humans, there is no *a priori* reason that this was inevitable. As such, Gould is congruent with the philosophical position of Dawkins, which only acknowledges purpose as a human construct; the idea of purpose only exists subsequent to the recent evolutionary development of human consciousness (which we will explore in Chapter Three). Consequently, though perhaps unwittingly, Gould has made a subtle transition between the scientific and religious realms, as the insistence on a happenstance view of the evolution of human beings carries implications for the theological issue of whether the world is inherently random or runs according to a divine plan. Although we will deliberate on this issue in Chapter Five, it is the aim at this point to demonstrate how Gould's NOMA model turns out to be inconsistent when the implications of science for theology become fully thought out. Ayala is also unequivocal in denouncing teleology in evolution:

> The over-all process of evolution cannot be said to be teleological in the sense of proceeding towards certain specified goals, preconceived or not. The only non-random process in evolution is natural selection understood as differential re-production. Natural selection is a purely mechanistic process . . .[87]

He reiterates this sentiment in a more recent publication. "The scientific account of these events does not necessitate recourse to a preordained plan, whether imprinted from the beginning or through successive interventions by an omniscient and almighty Designer".[88] These statements reflect a philosophical position, deeply rooted in science, that has profound implications for theological reflection on the nature of creation.

A further example that substantiates the argument that the NOMA approach is wrought with inconsistencies can be found in Ayala's work, which delves into the realm of theodicy (the theological problem of evil)—another important theological issue that we will be considering in Chapter Five. Although Ayala claims to support a nonrelational view of science and religion, he conversely maintains that evolution provides an account for the existence of evil/suffering in the living world. As such, evolution partly provides a response to the theodicy problem (this will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five).[89] Therefore, we can acknowledge that the three overlapping issues between

evolution and religion outlined above (the soul/immaterial life force, purpose or plan in nature, and the problem of evil) constitute considerable challenges for the NOMA approach. It is due to these challenges that we can validate our choice for using an alternative methodology, namely, establishing a dialogical relationship.

It has already been ascertained that highly influential theological figures such as John Paul II and David Tracy, among others, have stressed the need for theology to have an interdisciplinary dimension. Tracy has also proposed that theology must acknowledge any movement that brings with it religious implications: "Practical theologies are related principally to the social reality of some particular social, political, cultural or pastoral movement or problematic which is argued to possess major religious import . . . ".[90] In the context of this work, we can propose that evolutionary science be taken to represent a scientific movement with "major religious import". In our critique of NOMA, we have indicated areas in which evolution may have religious implications, and Chapters Four and Five will provide further examples. Moreover, the concept that evolution carries theological import has been acknowledged since Charles Darwin himself first publicized evolution by natural selection as an account for the existence of living organisms, as he wrote:

> I see no good reason why the views given in this volume should shock the religious feelings of anyone. . . . A celebrated author and divine has written to me that he has gradually learnt to see that it is just as noble a conception of the Deity to believe that He created a few original forms capable of self development into other needful forms. . . .[91]

In the 1950s, the highly influential Swiss theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar also believed evolution to be of theological significance, as he felt it was indispensable for a universal conception of man, life, and nature.[92] Consequently, this project will adopt an integrative approach to science and religion. This approach can be summarized by referral to Alister McGrath, who draws from Gould and proposes that science and religion are ". . . 'partially overlapping magisteria' (a POMA so to speak), reflecting a realization that science and religion offer possibilities of cross-fertilization on account of the interpretation of their subjects and methods".[93] While we will proceed with this methodology toward science and theology, there are elements of Dawkins' work that we will not specifically set out to engage with, though there may be partial overlaps. These elements of Dawkins will now be discussed.

### *Dawkins, Atheism, and Religion*

Although Dawkins' atheistic and religiously antagonistic stance is evident throughout his work,[94] his most explicit pronouncement of atheism and his views on religion are found in *The God Delusion*, a book dedicated to the topic. In *The God Delusion*, we can discern two elements of Dawkins' worldview that we will not directly engage with: his arguments against the existence of God, and his critique of religion. In *The God Delusion*, Dawkins attempts to deconstruct and demonstrate fallacies in arguments for the existence of God that are commonly proposed by religious apologists.[95] Correspondingly, he also offers arguments that seek to demonstrate the improbability of the existence of God from a scientific perspective.[96] In addition to his arguments for atheism, Dawkins also critiques the premise of religion and faith, which he believes can be morally dubious: "Faith can be very very dangerous, and deliberately to implant it into the vulnerable mind of an innocent child is a grievous wrong".[97] This work will not seek to refute Dawkins' arguments with regard to these two premises (atheism and the evil of religion) given that a significant amount of publications have already provided substantial rebuttals to Dawkins on these points. Particularly notable are publications by Keith Ward[98] and Alister McGrath.[99] However, other authoritative rebuttals come from Ian S. Markham,[100] Karl Giberson and Mariano Artigas,[101] John Haught,[102] Kathleen Jones,[103] Mike Starkey,[104] Rob Slane,[105] R. J. Fallon,[106] David Robertson,[107] John Blanchard,[108] John Cornwall,[109] Richard Grigg,[110] and Thomas Crean.[111] Dawkins' arguments for atheism and the evils of religion have been persuasively shown to be philosophically weak and often inconsistent by the scholars mentioned here. While noting these rebuttals, we will alternatively seek to engage specifically with Dawkins' scientific/pseudo-philosophical worldview, which will be explored in Chapters Two and Three.

With regard to Dawkins' stance on atheism and religion, we will however, acknowledge the thesis put forth by British theologian Gerard J. Hughes, who suggested that even though Dawkins ultimately fails in his task to repudiate religion, Christians may have something to learn from him.[112] Thus in the context of this work, Dawkins' criticisms of theism/religion will be taken into consideration as a part of the dialogue we hope to establish. This is opposed to aiming toward a refutation of such criticisms, given that such attempts have already been made by several scholars, and that such direct argumentation is not conducive of advancing theological dialogue. An analogous outlook is put forth by influential German theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg, who insisted on the importance of articulating a convincing response to atheist critiques.[113] Dawkins' atheism can also be considered beneficial to a theological dialogue

with science for reasons outlined by the Irish theologian James Mackey. Mackey proposed that opening dialogue with atheist scientists can mitigate potential criticisms of subjectivity; that scientists who profess religiosity "might be suspect of tinting the picture painted in order to bring out some recognisable religious colouring".[114] Mackey, therefore, felt it safer to engage with confirmed atheists such as physicist David Deutsch and philosopher Bertrand Russell.[115] By engaging with Dawkins, we cannot be accused of choosing a scientific model that is easily amenable to a theological worldview, which may perhaps hinder a balanced approach. In the next section, we will outline the philosophical approach to scientific truth that will be adopted in the context of a dialogue with Dawkins.

### *Science and Truth*

Another interesting dimension of a possible dialogue with Dawkins that should be acknowledged is the spectrum of philosophical/theological attitudes toward scientific truth. Pertaining to this topic, Küng's theology provides an example of where an approach to scientific truth becomes consequential for a science-religion dialogue.[116] Küng directly cites two key twentieth-century philosophers as influences on his thought in this regard: Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn.[117] The Austrian-born philosopher Karl Popper postulated that legitimate assertions on what is scientifically empirical or not, rests not with the verifiability of a hypothesis, but with falsifiability: "not the verifiability but the falsifiability of a system is to be taken as a criterion of demarcation".[118] A statement cannot be considered scientifically demonstrable unless it is falsifiable. Küng offers the following example:

> [W]ere a statement such as "All copper conducts electricity" to be verified in experience, all the copper in the universe would have to be examined for this property, and of course, that is impossible. So no theory can be as reliable as the experiment on which it bases itself in generalization.[119]

Therefore Küng, following from Popper, asserts that scientific statements based upon verifiability cannot be held to be fundamentally true. "Thus science appears to be a continually ongoing process of trial and error, which does not lead to the secure possession of truth but rather to a progressive approximation of truth, a process in other words of continual alteration and evolution".[120] In the context of this work, this premise could be used as a critique/limitation of Dawkins, by holding that his scientific views cannot be considered

fundamentally true; they can only be described as a "progressive approximation to truth".[121] The potential for this critique, however, is not a route that this work will explore, though it is worth acknowledging.

From the distinguished philosopher/historian of science Thomas Kuhn, Küng adopts the thesis that science can be dogmatic, working within the framework of a system of beliefs and values (a paradigm). Therefore, scientific claims to legitimate objectivity are suspect. Kuhn articulates his perspective: "Scientific knowledge, like language, is intrinsically the common property of a group or else nothing at all. To understand it we shall need to know the special characteristics of the groups that create and use it".[122] In this view, scientific statements may be vulnerable to subjectivity, given that they necessarily arise from within a context of an ideology. Küng insightfully explains, "Natural Science is by no means merely ideologically neutral, simply ascertaining the data, the facts, in an entirely objective fashion without making value judgments".[123] A similar outlook is defended by Paul Ricoeur, who felt that knowledge is only obtained through a detour of analysis.[124] The physicist/theologian John Polkinghorne also portrayed this view metaphorically, by suggesting that scientists wear spectacles behind their eyes.[125] Science can be understood thus, at least in part, as hermeneutical. The hermeneutical nature of science may be held as a caveat in studying Dawkins, as it could be suggested that his scientific outlook is predicated upon an ideological position and consequently, nonempirical. Notwithstanding, while the claim will be made that Dawkins' philosophical worldview influences his elucidation of natural selection (see Chapter Two), it will not be suggested that science is *wholly* reducible to hermeneutical factors. Moreover, it is the fact that Dawkins represents an ideological view that partly makes him an appropriate dialogue partner for this book. In this sense, we will align ourselves with the contemporary theologian Nancey Murphy and scientist George F. R. Ellis, who propose the following interpretation of science:

> While we recognize the thoroughly human character of scientific knowledge and culturally specific factors in the origin of the scientific enterprise itself, we reject the various sociological critiques that reduce science to culture—or gender-specific factors. We claim that objective, cross-cultural criteria exist for rational justification of scientific research programmes.[126]

For the purposes of dialogue, we will adopt the view that science is a practical method of reasoning that seeks to ascertain a 'technical truth'. This truth may

not be absolute given Popper's philosophical reflections on falsifiability, though it may be utilized for practical purposes. Such a view is outlined by Bertrand Russell, who offers the following insight:

> Science thus encourages abandonment of the search for absolute truth, and the substitution of what may be called "technical" truth, which belongs to any theory that can be successfully employed in inventions or in predicting the future. "Technical" truth is a matter of degree: a theory from which more successful inventions and predictions spring is truer than one which gives rise to fewer.[127]

Dawkins himself outlines a similar position with regard to the abandonment of the search for an absolute truth:

> It is forever true that DNA is a double helix, true that if you and a chimpanzee (or an octopus or kangaroo) trace your ancestors back far enough you will eventually hit a shared ancestor. To a pedant, these are still hypotheses which might be falsified tomorrow. But they never will be. . . . Even if they are nominally hypotheses on probation, these statements are true in exactly the same sense as the ordinary truths of everyday life; true in the same sense that you have a head, and that my desk is wooden.[128]

Certain scientific premises, such as the general edifice of evolutionary theory, can be taken as 'true' in the 'practical' or 'ordinary' sense as outlined by Russell and Dawkins (this can be substantiated by the convergence of conflicting schools of thought such as Dawkins and Gould on key points in evolutionary theory). Scientific statements are interpreted in this view, not as elements of a paradigm or ideology but as a reflection of the world in common mental experience.

## Limitations

Heretofore in this chapter, we have mapped out our motives for engaging dialogically with Dawkins and the methodological approach we will adopt for such a dialogue. We will now acknowledge the limitations of considering Dawkins as a conversation partner for theology. Firstly, we will exhibit Dawkins' contempt for religion and theology as a legitimate discipline in the intellectual marketplace. Secondly, we will suggest that Dawkins' lack of theological background, evident in the absence of theological substance in his

work, may pose a challenge to establishing an intellectual relationship. Lastly, we will discuss criticisms aimed at Dawkins on the basis of his intolerance toward contrary worldviews; that his perspective is overtly monist, and thus difficult to engage with dialogically.

### *Dawkins' Contempt for Religion and Theology*

Dawkins is unabashed in proclaiming his contempt for the subject of theology. In a letter to the UK *Independent* newspaper in 2007, Dawkins addresses a criticism put forth by John Cornwall[129]—that he is not proficiently versed in the subject of theology to provide a convincing argument against God. He responds to this criticism as follows: "It assumes there is a serious subject called theology, which one must study in depth before one can disbelieve in God. . . . Would you need to read learned volumes on leprechology before disbelieving in leprechauns?"[130] Here, Dawkins equates theology to the hypothetical study of leprechauns to convey his contempt toward the discipline. His disregard for the legitimacy of theology is also salient as he writes that theology "lacks even the smallest hint of a connection with the real world. As Thomas Jefferson said, when founding his University of Virginia, 'A professorship of Theology should have no place in our institution'".[131] Dawkins also challenges the intellectual productivity of theology, as he states:

> What has theology ever said that is of the smallest use to anybody? When has theology ever said anything that is demonstrably true and not obvious? I have listened to theologians, read them, debated against them. I have never heard any of them ever say anything of the smallest use, anything that was not either platitudinously obvious or downright false.[132]

Dawkins' clear distain for theology is an obvious barrier in attempting to foster an intellectual relationship with him. His repudiation of the subject might influence his appraisal of theological ideas to the point where it may be difficult to appreciate his arguments as objective or balanced. The theologian Nicholas Lash articulates a similar criticism:

> Now it is a fundamental feature of good academic work in *any* field that it is undertaken with a passion for accurate description and disinterested respect for the materials with which one is working. Dawkins, the biologist, seems not to have acquired the mental discipline necessary for work in the humanities and social sciences.

> One cannot imagine a physicist holding an atomic particle, or a zoologist a yak, with the same sustained contempt and loathing, the same cavalier disregard for accurate description, the same ignorance of the literature, with which Dawkins treats all religious beliefs, ideas and practices.[133]

It is bad academic practice to treat subjects with such contempt, as opposed to making an accurate and balanced evaluation. This can be treated as a limitation of engaging in a theological dialogue with Dawkins, as such a dialogue will not be mutually respectful. Literary theorist Terry Eagleton offers a comparable critique, by inferring that Dawkins' discarding of theology makes him particularly ill-positioned to provide a persuasive argument against theological ideas:

> Card-carrying rationalists like Dawkins, who is the nearest thing to a professional atheist we have had since Bertrand Russell, are in one sense the least well-equipped to understand what they castigate, since they don't believe there is anything there to be understood, or at least anything worth understanding. This is why they invariably come up with vulgar caricatures of religious faith that would make a first-year theology student wince. The more they detest religion, the more ill-informed their criticisms of it tend to be. . . . When it comes to theology . . . any shoddy old travesty will pass muster.[134]

Dawkins' repudiation of theology may, by proxy, prevent him from finding solid academic footing from which to provide a solid criticism against it. This point leads us on to our next limitation of dialogue with Dawkins: his lack of theological understanding.

### *Absence of Theological Substance in Dawkins*

John Haught, whose work on the implications of evolutionary theory for theology will be a significant resource in this book (particularly in Chapter Five), suggests that Dawkins avoids a serious engagement with critically reflective theological scholarship. "Clearly the new atheists[135] are not familiar with any of these religious thinkers,[136] and the hostility to what they call theology has almost nothing to do with theology as I use the term".[137] Consequently, the intellectual quality of his atheism is unnecessarily diminished.[138] Keith Ward has also claimed that Dawkins "knows nothing about theology",[139] and moreover, misunderstands the concept of God and

the nature of belief.[140] Ward, furthermore, also criticizes Dawkins for his lack of philosophical prowess in espousing an atheistic materialism.[141] Consistent criticisms are also produced by Terry Eagleton[142] and theologian Owen C. Thomas, who writes of Dawkins, "His understanding of Christianity and religion in general is massively uninformed and amounts to a caricature consisting of its most fundamentalist and obscurantist forms".[143] Dawkins' ignorance of theology may signify a limitation of a theological project such as this one, as Nicholas Lash perceptively illustrates by quoting Dawkins: "There are some weird things (such as the Trinity, transubstantiation, incarnation) that we are not *meant* to understand. Don't even *try* to understand one of these, for the attempt might destroy it".[144] Lash's response is enlightening, as he explains: "That sentence gives me a strange feeling, as I sit reading it in my study—the walls of which are filled, from top to bottom, with volumes dedicated to attempts at just such understanding".[145] Lash thus insists that Dawkins is ". . . polemically ignorant of the extent to which faith's quest for understanding has, for century after century, been central to the practice and identity of those educational enterprises which we call the great religious traditions of the world . . . ".[146]

In a similar vein, Gerard J. Hughes also illustrates Dawkins' lack of understanding about the nature of theological studies. He points to another of Dawkins' critiques of Christianity, which, similar to Lash's point, suggests that Christianity avoids self-criticism:

> His [Dawkins'] . . . point is that Christians hold a view of faith which places religious faith completely beyond reasonable discussion or scientific counter-argument. In our modern world, such unsupported prejudices deserve no credence, and can be positively damaging. Any beliefs worthy of respect must stand up to scientific criticism.[147]

However, contrary to Dawkins' criticism, Hughes explains how Christianity has never sought to promote anything that conflicts with rational thinking:

> Very few Christians, and certainly very few Catholics, have seriously maintained that anyone has to believe, in faith, something which is contrary to what can be rationally established. Even the classical American Fundamentalists in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries in their various ways held that science could indeed support what they believed to be the truths taught by the bible. They thought there was, or could be found, archaeological evidence for the age of

> the earth which could match calculations made from biblical data on the ages of the patriarchs, or would demonstrate the universality of the Flood, or the existence of leviathans capable of giving hospitality to Jonah. Whatever one might think about the reasonableness of such expectations, they were part of an overall view that faith and human reason could not end in conflict.[148]

Hughes points out that even believers in a literal interpretation of the Bible have often sought to harmonize their beliefs with reason by searching for supporting evidence. Hughes therefore, echoing Lash, exposes Dawkins' ignorance of Christianity's commitment to reason.

Furthermore, Dawkins' representation of religion in history is strongly biased toward portraying its negative impact on the world, attributing several human-made catastrophes to religion:

> Imagine . . . a world with no religion. Imagine no suicide bombers, no 9/11, no 7/7, no Crusades, no witch-hunts, no Gunpowder plot, no Indian partition, no Israeli/Palestinian wars, no Serb/Croat/Muslim massacres, no persecution of the Jews as 'Christ-killers', no Northern Ireland troubles, no 'honour killings'. . . no Taliban to blow up ancient statues, no public beheadings of blasphemers . . .[149]

However, here Dawkins fails to discuss the complex political and sociological circumstances that had a far greater influence in many of these atrocities. For example, he attributes the troubles in Northern Ireland to religion, as opposed to the centuries of political instability on the island of Ireland. Similarly, he proclaims that without religion, the 9/11 terrorist attacks would not have taken place, yet he again makes no reference to the intricate political history between the United States and the Middle East.

Moreover, Dawkins conveniently ignores or downplays the positive impact that religion has had on the world to suit his own purposes. For example, he notes that "[i]t is surely true that black slaves in America were consoled by promises of another life, which blunted their dissatisfaction with this one and thereby benefited their owners".[150] Yet Dawkins understates the role that religious belief had in the African American civil rights movement, particularly with regard to Martin Luther King, one the movement's most influential proponents:

> In America, the ideals of racial equality were fostered by political leaders of the calibre of Martin Luther King. . . . The emancipations

> of slaves and of women owed much to charismatic leaders. Some of these leaders were religious; some were not. . . . Although Martin Luther King was a Christian, he derived his philosophy of non-violent civil disobedience directly from Gandhi, who was not.[151]

King, himself holding a Ph.D. in theology, may have been influenced by Gandhi, a non-Christian. However, he explicitly referred to a faithfulness in his 'I Have a Dream' speech in 1963:

> I have a dream that one day every valley shall be exalted, every hill and mountain shall be made low, the rough places will be made plain, and the crooked places will be made straight, and the glory of the Lord shall be revealed, and all flesh shall see it together. This is our hope. This is the faith that I go back to the South with. With this faith we will be able to hew out of the mountain of despair a stone of hope. With this faith we will be able to transform the jangling discords of our nation into a beautiful symphony of brotherhood. With this faith we will be able to work together, to pray together, to struggle together, to go to jail together, to stand up for freedom together, knowing that we will be free one day.[152]

The sentiment of King was also a major influence on James Cone, considered the founder of the Black Liberation Theology movement. Cone used the Christian message of the Bible to empower and liberate African Americans from previous generations' oppression, which demonstrates how religion can, contrary to Dawkins' statements, be used to encourage equality over slavery.[153] Thus Dawkins suffers from a form of at best academic 'looseness', at worst academic malpractice in his selective reading of history.

Lash and Ward also both single out Dawkins' attempt to invalidate Aquinas' 'five proofs' for the existence of God as an example of his lack of theological comprehension. Lash reviews Dawkins' arguments against Aquinas' five proofs by stating, "What, in fact, we are given is a shoddy misrepresentation of Aquinas' arguments, with no indication of where they might be found, what others have made of them, or what purpose they were constructed to serve".[154] Ward echoes this criticism, as he responds to Dawkins' alleged intellectual victory:

> Dawkins claims that they [Aquinas' five ways] are easily exposed as vacuous, and he does so in just three pages. This would be a very impressive achievement, except that he does not in fact deal with

> Aquinas' Five Ways at all. What he does is to consider instead five arguments of his own, which bear a vague resemblance to those of Aquinas—in some cases, a resemblance so vague that it can no longer be recognized.[155]

We will not, at this point, analyze Dawkins' opposition to Aquinas' five ways, as this would take us into the arguments for/against atheism, which have already been given significant attention. We seek to ascertain here that Dawkins has been criticized for the weakness of his theological scholarship, which we can distinguish as a legitimate limitation in opening a dialogical relationship with his work. In addition to Dawkins' lack of theological substance, criticisms of his lack of atheistic substance have also been proffered by authorities such as Haught, who deems Dawkins' atheism to be "soft".[156] Haught criticizes the substance of Dawkins' atheism in comparison to highly influential thinkers such as Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Marx, and Sigmund Freud, who "provide interesting theoretical frameworks for their theories".[157] Moreover, he argues that Dawkins et al. do not think out the implications of their rejection of theism as thoroughly as thinkers such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Bertrand Russell, Albert Camus, and Jean-Paul Sartre.[158] Similarly, Tina Beattie and Ian S. Markham (who are critical of Dawkins) profess their appreciation for the arguments of atheists such as Nietzsche, of whom Beattie admiringly writes:

> Theologians as well as philosophers and cultural theorists recognise in his critiques of religion and in his challenging of established truths, values and meanings a profound unmasking of the deceptions which allow power and ideology to masquerade as truth, often in the name of God.[159]

Markham is more abrupt; as he compares Dawkins and Nietzsche, he concludes ". . . Nietzsche has better arguments".[160] Again, it is not necessary in the context of this work to provide a comparison between the atheism of Dawkins and Nietzsche and other "hard core atheists" as classified by Haught. We are highlighting that Dawkins' deficiency in theological and atheistic argumentation is an obstacle to considering him as a potential dialogue partner for theology.

### *Dawkins' Intolerance*

One further limitation that should be acknowledged is the criticism put forth that Dawkins is dogmatic in his beliefs, leaving him intolerant of others.

Theologian and former pupil of Dawkins, Timothy Jenkins, writes of the biologist that "he simply believes the books he agrees with are true, and the books he disagrees with are false".[161] Jenkins here criticizes Dawkins for a lack of openness toward alternative views. Alister McGrath provides further criticism in this regard. He perceives Dawkins as purposefully excluding the history of the perennial revision of scientific theories from his espousal of science:

> How can Dawkins be so sure that his current beliefs are true, when history shows a persistent pattern of the abandonment of scientific theories as better approaches emerge? What historian of science can fail to note that what was once regarded as secure knowledge was eroded through the passage of time? Conveniently enough, Dawkins turns a blind eye to history.[162]

Thus Dawkins may be overly confident in his promotion of science. He neglects to express that science is constantly open to revision, consequently showing an intolerance toward those who do not share his scientific outlook. Ward echoes McGrath's criticism, as he insists that Dawkins holds a perspective intolerant of others.[163] Hughes poses a similar critique, as he highlights Dawkins' strident promotion of "science as the gold standard for all truth".[164] Hughes distinguishes this as a significant problem with Dawkins' view, as he explains how science is not capable of explaining certain phenomena—this is a similar point to Stephen Jay Gould's NOMA, although Hughes does not, as Gould does, imply that religion and science are completely separate disciplines:

> Where I think Dawkins is at his weakest is in what I would term his 'scientism'. This is disguised by the fact that he at every turn insists upon the importance of evidence, as indeed he should (though it must be said that he does not in this respect always practise what he preaches). The claim that every question about ourselves and our world can in principle be settled by methods which can ultimately be reduced to those of physics is a highly disputable claim, disputable for reasons which have nothing to do with religion . . .[165]

In essence, Hughes criticizes Dawkins for elevating scientific reason to the highest order of importance. He gives scientific knowledge primacy. Yet this elevation of scientific knowledge may diminish other legitimate paths to truth such as emotions and intuition. David Hume, for example, makes this point in his *Treatise of Human Nature*, which became a widely influential sentiment in philosophy: "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions,

and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them".[166] Dawkins' commitment to the primacy of scientific knowledge will thus prevent him, as Hughes states, from acknowledging subjects that are beyond the realm of scientific inquiry, yet equally valid: "Whether there are good reasons for holding that God exists is indeed a controversial question; but it is not, nor is it reducible to, a scientific question".[167] Dawkins can therefore be seen as intolerant of nonscientific modes of inquiry.

With regard to Dawkins' intolerance, we can also discern his atheism as a related limitation. As we have already noted, Dawkins was chosen as a dialogue partner for theology in part due to the fact that his view was significantly distant from a theologically sympathetic stance. However, such conceptual distance may prove hindering in seeking to establish an intellectual relationship, particularly if as the critics above suggest, he is uncompromising in his position. However, despite these important limitations, we can suggest that they are outweighed by the motives presented earlier. Moreover, it is precisely because of the hostility between Dawkins and his theological critics that we should seek to engage with him, thereby demonstrating how theology can gain insight from views unsympathetic to theology. Dawkins' uncompromising atheism and ignorance of theology highlights his 'otherness', which as we have discussed, can be an obstacle to dialogue. However, paradoxically, it is also his otherness that makes him a good candidate for theology to consider, as it broadens the scope of theology to seek insight in less obvious areas of the intellectual marketplace.

## *Conclusion*

We have now established the methodological background for this project. We noted that this book will proceed in the context of the post-globalization intellectual world. In recent decades, several authoritative theologians have placed emphasis on the necessity for pluralistic and interdisciplinary theological investigations in this post-globalization context, which is arguably becoming more and more prominent as the years pass. Therefore, we can follow theologians such as Leonardo Boff and insist that in this context, theology must espouse a pluralistic character. With this appreciation of the current situation, we have opted to open a dialogical relationship with a worldview that is presented as contrary to theology—the view of Dawkins who could be considered as an ideological and interdisciplinary other, making him a good choice as a conversation partner. By engaging with Dawkins, we are advocating for a theological paradigm that seeks to expand the scope of traditional theological resources; we are seeking new areas to explore.

We then outlined the approach that will be taken toward a dialogue with Dawkins. We noted that while others have promoted a confrontational model for the relationship between science and religion (for example Dawkins himself), or a view that sees science and religion as completely separate domains of inquiry (such as Gould), we will prefer an integrative approach—similar to McGrath's 'POMA'. Moreover, pertaining to Dawkins' views on atheism and religion, we acknowledged that a significant deal of attention has been given to refuting his arguments from a variety of scholars. Therefore, we will not seek to add to this body of critical work. Rather, we will examine Dawkins' scientific/philosophical perspective, and demonstrate how engaging with this perspective may be beneficial to the theologian. The approach toward science and truth was also outlined. We noted that we will not challenge Dawkins on the basis of whether science can claim absolute truth. We will proceed acknowledging, with Russell, Dawkins, and others, that science can lead us to a 'practical truth'.

We also acknowledged the limitations of opening a dialogue with Dawkins. Dawkins' unabashed contempt for theology as a subject can be considered a serious hindrance, as it will undoubtedly compromise his objectivity when considering theological arguments. Moreover, his lack of theological and atheistic substance was discussed. This may also be a significant caveat in attempting to intellectually converse with his work. Similarly, his single-minded intolerance of other viewpoints can be interpreted as a substantial weakness in his work, which may also hinder dialogue. Notwithstanding these limitations, however, we can give greater weight to our motives for engaging with Dawkins. As such, we will begin this intellectual conversation by considering the scientific foundations of his worldview in the next chapter.

## Notes

1. Leonardo Boff, 'Is Cosmic Christ Greater Than Jesus of Nazareth?', *Concilium* 1 (2007): 1: 57

2. The symposium was held at the University of Tübingen. The lectures were eventually published in Hans Küng and David Tracy, eds., *Paradigm Change in Theology: A Symposium for the Future* (Worcester: Billings & Sons, 1989).

3. Küng was stripped of his license to teach Catholic theology on December 18, 1979 by the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith, largely due to his critique of the doctrine of papal infallibity in his *Infallible? An Inquiry* (New York: Doubleday, 1983). See John Kiwiet, *Hans Küng* (Waco, TX: Word, 1985), 88–89. However, Küng remained engaged in scholarship, and his interest in the field of science and theology make him a noteworthy theologian for this book. He acknowledged the significance of science in theological reasoning in *Does God Exist?* (London:

Collins, 1978) and also devoted one publication completely to the issue, *The Beginning of All Things: Science and Religion* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007).

4. Hans Küng 'A New Basic Model for Theology: Divergencies and Convergencies', in Küng and Tracy, eds., *Paradigm Change in Theology*, 440.

5. Hans Küng, *Does God Exist?*, 87. Küng explains that Augustine held the pursuit of knowledge with the desire for pleasures of the flesh, and desire for power as three irresistible evils.

6. Karl Rahner, *Theological Investigations, Vol. VI: Concerning Vatican Council II*, trans. Karl H. and Boniface Kruger (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1969), 33.

7. Ibid., 50.

8. Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972), 276. Lonergan, however, discussed pluralism in the context of evangelisation: that socio-cultural plurality requires a pluralistic approach to preaching the gospel.

9. Dermot A. Lane, 'Faith and Culture: The Challenge of Inculturation', in Dermot A. Lane, ed., *Religion and Culture in Dialogue: A Challenge for the Next Millennium* (Dublin: Columba, 1993), 11.

10. Ibid., 19.

11. David F. Ford, 'Epilogue: Christian Theology at the Turn of the Millennium', in David F. Ford, ed., *The Modern Theologians: An Introduction to Christian Theology in the Twentieth Century* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1997), 72.

12. Francis Schüssler Fiorenza, 'Systematic Theology: Tasks and Methods', in Francis Schüssler Fiorenza and John Galvin, eds., *Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1992), 68.

13. Alister McGrath, *Christian Theology: An Introduction*, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 535.

14. Máire Byrne, *The Names of God in Judaism, Christianity and Islam: A Basis for Interfaith Dialogue* (Dublin: Continuum, 2011), 3.

15. Enda McDonagh, 'Beyond 'Pure' Theology', *The Furrow* 50, no. 11 (Nov. 2009): 581.

16. Though naturalism and materialism are not strictly synonymous, we can understand, along with the renowned Australian philosopher David M. Armstrong, materialism (or physicalism) as a subset of naturalism; see David M. Armstrong, 'Naturalism, Materialism and First Philosophy', *Philosophia* 8, no. 2–3 (1978): 261.

17. Keith Ward, *Is Religion Dangerous?* (Oxford: Lion, 2006), 90.

18. John Haught, *God After Darwin* (Oxford: Westview, 2000), 26.

19. Ian S. Markham, *Against Atheism: Why Dawkins, Hitchens, and Harris Are Fundamentally Wrong* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 15–16.

20. Simon Blackburn, 'Naturalism', in Simon Blackburn, ed., *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

21. Karl Giberson and Mariano Artigas, *Oracles of Science: Celebrity Scientists Versus God and Religion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 234.

22. Ibid., 234.

23. David Ray Griffin, *Reenchantment Without Supernaturalism: A Process Philosophy of Religion* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 18.

24. Ibid., 18.

25. Keith Ward, *God, Chance and Necessity* (Oxford: Oneworld, 1996), 11; also, *Why There Almost Certainly Is a God: Doubting Dawkins* (Oxford: Lion, 2008), 20. However, Ward also suggests that this position has serious philosophical weaknesses and is not held in high esteem among his academic peers, *Is Religion Evil?* 87–90; also, *Why There Almost Certainly Is a God*, 14–15. This is particularly due to ongoing scientific debate on the nature of matter itself.

26. Paul Ricoeur, *The Conflict of Interpretations*, ed. Don Hide (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 440.

27. James Mackey, *Christianity and Creation: The Essence of Christian Faith and Its Future among Religions* (New York: Continuum, 2006), 64.

28. David Tracy, *Dialogue with the Other: The Inter-Religious Dialogue* (Leuven: Peeters, 1990), 95. Jesuit theologian Francis X. Clooney makes a congruent point, as he suggests that an interfaith methodology is necessary given that the distance between faith traditions is ever diminishing; see 'Comparative Theology', John Webster et al., eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Systematic Theology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 654.

29. Michael Paul Gallagher, *What Are They Saying about Unbelief?* (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist, 1995), 2.

30. Ibid., 2.

31. David Tracy and John B. Cobb, *Talking About God: Doing Theology in the Context of Modern Pluralism* (New York: Seabury, 1983), 2.

32. Held in Rome on April 1, 1980. The international congress, titled 'Univ '80', addressed six thousand students from forty-three countries.

33. Don O'Leary, *Roman Catholicism and Modern Science: A History* (New York: Continuum, 2007), 193. For the full address, see Pope John Paul II, 'The Moral Dimension of Study and Research', available online.

34. John Cobb, 'Response to Johann Baptist Metz and Langdon Gilkey', in Küng and Tracy, eds., *Paradigm Change in Theology*, 386. Theologians Erik Borgman and Wilfred Felix have made similar statements, as they co-wrote that interdisciplinary research "can be a way to rediscover theology as a discipline", 'Introduction', *Concilium* 2 (2006): 9.

35. I refer here to the church's history of condemnation of scientific hypotheses such as Copernicanism and the censuring of Galileo, encapsulated in the introduction to Don O'Leary's *Roman Catholicism and Modern Science: A History*, xi-xx.

36. Jürgen Moltmann, *Science and Wisdom*, trans. Margaret Kohl (London: SCM, 2003), 7.

37. Hans Küng, *The Beginning of All Things*, xii.

38. For example, Professor of Religion Robert Crawford, *Is God a Scientist: A Dialogue Between Science and Religion* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 1; also, Alister McGrath, *The Foundations of Dialogue in Science and Religion* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 1.

39. Tina Beattie, *The New Atheists: The Twilight of Reason and the War on Religion* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 2007), 15.

40. Alister McGrath has written extensively on Dawkins, publishing two books, *Dawkins' God: Genes, Memes and the Meaning of Life* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005) and *The Dawkins Delusion: Atheist Fundamentalism and Denial of the Divine* (London: SPCK, 2007) among other publications on the topics of Dawkins, science, and religion, for example, 'Has Science Eliminated God?—Richard Dawkins and the Meaning of Life', *Science and Christian Belief* 17, no. 2 (Oct. 2005): 115–35. McGrath was also interviewed by Dawkins for his television series *The Root of all Evil.* Though the particular interview with McGrath did not make the edited version aired on UK television station Channel 4, the full interview is available online.

41. Alister McGrath, 'Evolutionary Biology in Recent Atheist Apologetics', in Denis R. Alexander and Ronald L. Numbers, eds., *Biology and Ideology: From Descartes to Dawkins* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 331.

42. Ibid., 331.

43. Daniel C. Dennett, 'The Selfish Gene as a Philosophical Essay', in Alan Grafen and Mark Ridley, eds., *Richard Dawkins: How a Scientist Changed the Way We Think* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 101.

44. Alister McGrath, 'Evolutionary Biology in Recent Atheist Apologetics', Denis R. Alexander and Ronald L. Numbers. eds., *Biology and Ideology: From Descartes to Dawkins*, 331.

45. Atheistic undertones and explicit denunciation of religious concepts are ubiquitous in Dawkins' work, in particular, *The God Delusion*. Dawkins also has a prominent public profile as a champion of atheism.

46. Beattie, *The New Atheists: The Twilight of Reason and the War on Religion*, vii.

47. This feature of Dawkins' work has been discerned and articulated by reviewers of his publications, for example, David Hull, 'A Quartet of Volumes on Genetics and Evolution' *The Quarterly Review of Biology* 62, no. 3 (Sept. 1987): 290; also, Janet L. Leonard, 'Review: Untitled', *The Quarterly Review of Biology* 70, no. 3 (Sept. 1995): 331; also, Laura Betzig, 'Review: Untitled', *The Quarterly Review of Biology* 72, no. 4 (Dec. 1997): 467; also, Kim Sterelny, 'Never Apologise, Always Explain', *Bioscience* 54, no. 5 (May 2004): 460; also, Ursula Goodenough, 'Walking Back Through Evolutionary Time', *BioScience*, 55, no. 10 (Sept. 2005): 798.

48. In tandem with such scholarly dialogues is the constant need for continuing dialogue and reform within the church. For discussion on this issue, see Gary Keogh, 'How Can the Church Survive? Reflections of a Celtic Tiger Cub', The Furrow 62, no. 4 (Apr. 2011); also, 'A New Generation of Family Values', The Furrow 63, no. 3 (Mar. 2012); also, 'An Irish Church Reform Movement?', The Furrow 63, no. 7/8 (July/Aug. 2012).

49. For examples, see Fergus Kerr, ed., *Contemplating Aquinas: On the Varieties of Interpretation* (London: SCM, 2003); also, Fergus Kerr, *After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), and Brian Davies, *Thomas Aquinas on God and Evil* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); also, Brian Davies, ed., *Aquinas' Summa Theologiae: Critical Essays* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006).

50. Carly Daniel-Hughes, *The Salvation of the Flesh in Tertullian of Carthage: Dressing for the Resurrection* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011)

51. Karen Kilby, *Karl Rahner: Theology and Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 2004); also, Karen Kilby, 'Karl Rahner's Ecclesiology', *New Blackfriars* 90, no. 1026 (Mar. 2009): 188–200.

52. John Webster, *Barth* (London: Continuum, 2004).

53. Beverly Mayne-Kienzle, *Hildegard of Bingen and Her Gospel Homilies: Speaking New Mysteries* (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2009).

54. John Scally, 'A Woman for Our Time: The Enduring legacy of Catherine of Siena', *Religious Life Review 50, no. 267 (Mar.–Apr. 2011).*

55. James Bremner, *The Power of Then: How the Sages of the Past Can Help Us in Our Everyday Lives* (London: Hay House, 2012).

56. Maureen Junker-Kenny, *Habermas and Theology* (London: T. & T. Clark, 2011), 1.

57. Sebastian Brock, *The Luminous Eye: The Spiritual World Vision of Saint Ephrem the Syrian* (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1992), 21.

58. David E. Jenkins, *God, Jesus and Life in the Spirit* (London: SCM, 1988), 37.

59. John Scally, *To Speed on Angel's Wings: The Story of the Sisters of St. John of God* (Dublin: Columba, 1995), 117.

60. Neil Messer, *Selfish Genes and Christian Ethics: Theological and Ethical Reflections on Evolutionary Biology* (London: SCM, 2007), 246.

61. Henri de Lubac, *The Drama of Atheistic Humanism* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1949).

62. Alister McGrath, *The Twilight of Atheism: The Rise and Fall of Disbelief in the Modern World* (London: Rider, 2004).

63. Gallagher, *What Are They Saying about Unbelief?*

64. McGrath, *The Foundations of Dialogue in Science and Religion*, 20.

65. *TGD*, particularly pp. 54–61 and 282–86; also, Richard Dawkins, 'Obscurantism to the Rescue', *The Quarterly Review of Biology* 72, no. 4 (Dec. 1997): 397–99.

66. Kurt Wise in John F. Ashton, ed., *In Six Days: Why 50 Scientists Choose to Believe in Creation* (London: New Holland, 1999), 332.

67. Paul Davies, *The Mind of God: Science and the Search for Ultimate Meaning* (London: Penguin, 1992), 16.

68. Francis Collins, *The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief* (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 6.

69. Kenneth Miller, *Finding Darwin's God, A Scientist's Search for the Common Ground Between God and Evolution* (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), 17.

70. The address was made on October 22, 1996, titled 'Truth Cannot Contradict Truth'. In this address, Pope John Paul II updated the Catholic position on evolution from Pope Pius XII's encyclical *Humani Generis*, who advocated for scepticism in approaching evolution, though did not explicitly reject it: Some however, rashly transgress this liberty of discussion, when they act as if the origin of the human body from pre-existing and living matter were already completely certain and proved by the facts which have been discovered up to now and by reasoning on those facts, and as if there were nothing in the sources of divine revelation which demands the greatest moderation and caution in this question. (*HG*: 37) John Paul recognised the scepticism in *Humani Generis*, though acknowledged that advancements in science verified the hypothesis of evolution, "Today, almost half a century after the publication of the encyclical, new knowledge has led to the recognition of the theory of evolution as more than a hypothesis". Therefore, John Paul's address signified a substantial shift in the pontifical attitude with respect to evolution.

71. Stephen Jay Gould, 'Nonoverlapping Magisteria', *Natural History* 106, no. 2 (Mar. 1997), 16–22, reprinted in *Leonardo's Mountain of Claims and the Diet of Worms: Essays on Natural History* (New York: Random House, 1998), 269–84.

72. Stephen Jay Gould, *Rocks of Ages: Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1999), 59–63.

73. Ibid., 62.

74. Ibid., 65.

75. Francisco J. Ayala, *Darwin's Gift to Science and Religion* (Washington, DC: Joseph Henry, 2007), ix. Italics in original.

76. Francisco J. Ayala, Statement at Templeton Prize News Conference (25 March 2010). Full text available online. It was for the strident opposition to the entanglement of science and religion that Ayala was awarded the Templeton Prize in 2010.

77. Stephen Jay Gould, *Rocks of Ages: Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life*, 92.

78. Ibid., 94.

79. Stephen Jay Gould, *Leonardo's Mountain of Claims and the Diet of Worms: Essays on Natural History*, 274.

80. Ibid., 282.

81. St. Augustine, quoted in Alister McGrath, *Christian Theology: An Introduction*, 441.

82. For an in-depth study of this idea, see Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being: A Study in the History of an Idea* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), originally published in 1936.

83. Stephen Jay Gould, *Leonardo's Mountain of Claims and the Diet of Worms: Essays on Natural History*, 282.

84. Ibid., 282.

85. Francisco J. Ayala, 'Teleological Explanations in Evolutionary Biology', *Philosophy of Science* 37, no. 1 (Mar. 1970): 8.

86. Stephen Jay Gould, *A Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History* (London: Vintage, 1990), 51.

87. Francisco J. Ayala, 'Teleological Explanations in Evolutionary Biology', *Philosophy of Science* 37, no. 1 (Mar. 1970): 10.

88. Francisco J. Ayala, 'Darwin's Greatest Discovery: Design Without Designer', *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the United States of America* 104 (May 2007): 8573.

89. Francisco J. Ayala, *Darwin's Gift to Science and Religion*, 3 and 5; also, see Cornelia Dean, 'Scientist at Work: Francisco J. Ayala', *New York Times*, 29 Apr. 2008; also, Chris Doran, 'From Atheism to Theodicy to Intelligent Design: Responding to the Work of Francisco J. Ayala', *Theology and Science* 7, no. 4 (Nov. 2009): 337–44.

90. Tracy and Cobb, *Talking About God*, 3.

91. Charles Darwin, *On the Origin of Species* (New York: Prometheus, 1991), 401, originally published in 1859.

92. Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Science, Religion and Christianity* (London: Burns & Oates, 1958), 9.

93. McGrath, *The Dawkins Delusion: Atheist Fundamentalism and Denial of the Divine*, 19.

94. For example, see *ROOE*, 111–55.

95. Dawkins attempts to refute eight arguments; Aquinas' proofs, the ontological and *a priori* arguments, the argument from beauty, the argument from personal experience, the argument from scripture, the argument from admired religious scientists, Pascal's wager, and Bayesian arguments.

96. Ibid., 113–59.

97. Ibid., 308. Original text reads "very very". Dawkins also attributes a variety of atrocities to religious belief, such as the terrorist attacks on New York and London in 2011 and 2005 respectively, the Crusades, the Israeli/Palestinian conflicts, and the troubles in Northern Ireland. Ibid., 1.

98. Ward, *Why There Almost Certainly Is a God.*

99. McGrath. *Dawkins' God: Genes, Memes and the Meaning of Life*; also, *The Dawkins Delusion: Atheist Fundamentalism and Denial of the Divine*; also, *Why God Won't Go Away: Engaging with the New Atheism* (London: SPCK, 2011).

100. Markham, *Against Atheism: Why Dawkins, Hitchens, and Harris Are Fundamentally Wrong.*

101. Giberson and Artigas, *Oracles of Science: Celebrity Scientists Versus God and Religion.*

102. John Haught, *God and the New Atheism: A Critical Response to Dawkins, Harris and Hitchens* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2008).

103. Kathleen Jones, *Challenging Richard Dawkins: Why Richard Dawkins Is Wrong about God* (London: Canterbury, 2007).

104. Mike Starkey, *Whose Delusion? Responding to The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins* (Kent: Church Army, 2007).

105. Rob Slane, *The God Reality: A Critique of Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion* (Eastnor Castle, Herefordshire: Day One, 2008).

106. R. J. Fallon, *Is Richard Dawkins the New Messiah? A Layman's Critique of The God Delusion* (Hull: Eka Books, 2008).

107. David Robertson, *The Dawkins Letters: Challenging Atheist Myths* (Fearn, Ross-shire: Christian Focus, 2007).

108. John Blanchard, *Dealing with Dawkins* (Darlington: E.Books, 2010).

109. John Cornwall, *Darwin's Angel: A Seraphic Response to The God Delusion* (London: Profile Books, 2007).

110. Richard Grigg, *Beyond the God Delusion: How Radical Theology Harmonizes Science and Religion* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008).

111. Thomas Crean O.P., *A Catholic Replies to Professor Dawkins* (Oxford: Family Publications, 2008).

112. Gerard J. Hughes, 'Dawkins: What He, and We, Need to Learn', *Thinking Faith—The Online Journal of the British Jesuits* (18 Jan. 2008), Web, 20 Dec., 2011.

113. Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Basic Questions in Theology Vol. II* (London: SCM, 1971), 195.

114. James Mackey, *The Scientist and the Theologian: On the Origins and Ends of Creation* (Dublin: Columba, 2007), 52.

115. Ibid., 46–63.

116. Although we can take Küng as an example, there is much discourse on approaches to truth in the context of the science-religion dialogue. For example, see two articles by Andreas Losch, 'On the Origins of Critical Realism', *Theology and Science* 7, no. 1 (Feb. 2009): 85–106, and

'Critical Realism—A Sustainable Bridge Between Science and Religion?', *Theology and Science* 8, no. 4 (Nov. 2010): 393–416.

117. Hans Küng, 'Paradigm Change in Theology: A Proposal for Discussion', in Küng and Tracy, eds., *Paradigm Change in Theology*, 3–33; also, Hans Küng, *Theology for the Third Millennium: An Ecumenical View* (London: HarperCollins, 1991), 123–69, and *The Beginning of All Things*, 28–29 and 52.

118. Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (New York: Routledge, 1959), 18.

119. Küng, *The Beginning of All Things*, 28.

120. Küng, *Theology for the Third Millennium: An Ecumenical View*, 130.

121. Ibid., 130.

122. Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 210.

123. Hans Küng, *Does God Exist?*, 110.

124. Paul Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 297.

125. John Polkinghorne, *Quarks, Chaos and Christianity: Questions to Science and Religion* (London: Triangle, 1994), 5.

126. Nancey Murphy and George F. R. Ellis, *On the Moral Nature of the Universe: Theology, Cosmology and Ethics* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 5.

127. Bertrand Russell, *Religion and Science* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1935), 15.

128. Richard Dawkins, *A Devil's Chaplain: Selected Essays* (London: Phoenix, 2003), 21. Dawkins, in this passage, is addressing philosophies such as Popper's and Kuhn's. Though he names both Popper and Kuhn, he does not make explicit reference to their texts, but rather offers an approximation of their views.

129. Cornwall, *Darwin's Angel: A Seraphic Response to The God Delusion.*

130. Richard Dawkins, 'Do You Have to Read Up on Leprechology before Disbelieving in Them?', *The Independent* (UK), 17 Sept. 2007.

131. Richard Dawkins, 'Afterword' to Lawrence Krauss, *A Universe from Nothing* (New York: Free Press, 2012), 190. Dawkins also begins chapter 3 of *TGD* with this Thomas Jefferson quotation.

132. Richard Dawkins, 'The Emptiness of Theology', *Free Inquiry* 18, no. 2 (Spring 1998). See also, 'Reply to Michael Pool', *Science and Christian Belief* 7, no. 1 (Apr. 1995): 45–50.

133. Nicholas Lash, 'Where Does the God Delusion Come From?', *New Blackfriars* 88, no. 1017 (Sept. 2007): 508.

134. Terry Eagleton, 'Lunging, Flailing, Mispunching', *The London Review of Books*, 19 Oct. 2006.

135. Haught uses the term 'new atheists' to refer to Dawkins, philosopher Sam Harris, and writer Christopher Hitchens. Harris and Hitchens also published books critical of religion between 2004 and 2007, *The End of Faith: Religion, Terror and the Future of Reason* (London: W. W. Norton, 2004) and *God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything* (London: Atlantic, 2007) respectively.

136. Haught refers here to theological thinkers such as Paul Tillich, Alfred North Whitehead, Paul Ricoeur, Rudolf Bultmann, Edward Schillibeeckx, Bernard Lonergan, Karl Barth, John Bowker, Elizabeth Johnson, Karl Rahner, Jürgen Moltmann, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Ian Barbour, David Tracy, Dorothee Soelle, Sallie McFague, Henri de Lubac, Hans Jonas, Emil Fackenheim, and Seyyed Hossein Nasr, among others.

137. Haught, *God and the New Atheism: A Critical Response to Dawkins, Harris and Hitchens*, xii.

138. Ibid., xii-xiii.

139. Ward, *Why There Almost Certainly Is a God*, 8.

140. Ward, *God, Chance and Necessity*, 96

141. Ward, *Is Religion Evil?* 90.

142. Terry Eagleton, *Reason, Faith and Revolution: Reflections on the God Debate* (London: Yale University Press, 2007), 2.

143. Owen C. Thomas, 'The Atheist Surge: Faith in Science, Secularism, and Atheism', *Theology and Science* 8, no. 2 (May 2010): 196.

144. *TGD*, 200, quoted in Lash, 'Where Does the God Delusion Come From?', 512.

145. Ibid., 512.

146. Ibid., 512.

147. Hughes, 'Dawkins: What He, and We, Need to Learn'.

148. Ibid.

149. *TGD*, 1–2.

150. Ibid., 169.

151. Ibid., 271.

152. Martin Luther King, 'I Have a Dream Speech', 28 Aug. 1963, Web, 10 Aug. 2012.

153. James Cone, 'Jesus Christ in Black Theology', in Curt Cadorette et al., eds., *Liberation Theology; An Introductory Reader* (New York: Orbis, 1997), 142.

154. Ibid., 509.

155. Ward, *Why There Almost Certainly Is a God*, 102. Capitalisation of 'five ways' in original.

156. Haught, *God and the New Atheism: A Critical Response to Dawkins, Harris and Hitchens*, 15–27.

157. Ibid., 18.

158. Ibid., 20–24.

159. Beattie, *The New Atheists: The Twilight of Reason and the War on Religion*, 149–50.

160. Markham, *Against Atheism: Why Dawkins, Harris and Hitchens Are Fundamentally Wrong*, 27.

161. Quoted in Lash, 'Where Does the God Delusion Come From?', 508.

162. McGrath, *The Twilight of Atheism: The Rise and Fall of Disbelief in the Modern World*, 95.

163. Ward, *Is Religion Dangerous?*, 150.

164. Hughes, 'Dawkins: What He, and We, Need to Learn'.

165. Ibid.

166. David Hume, *A Treatise on Human Nature* (New York: Dover, 2003), 295, originally published in 1739.

167. Hughes, 'Dawkins: What He, and We, Need to Learn'.